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q 201This article uses the metaphor of overﬂow to understand the role played by the revelation of previously secret ex-
perience in the controversial Museum of Genocide Victims in Vilnius, Lithuania. It shows how efforts to disclose
Soviet repression and to consolidate and sustain a particular community of survivors, the Union of Political Prisoners
and Deportees, produced an “excess” of revelation in a context of radical political change that in the process led to a
failure to represent the complexity of Lithuania’s past by sidelining the Holocaust in its narrative of repression. In
contrast to other studies that understand this museum as an instrument of a particular governmental ideology, I
suggest an alternative explanation of the origins and character of this museum, arguing that it should be understood
as a community museum. I argue that the museum’s failure to provide a balanced presentation of the past is better
understood as an effect of an excessive desire to reveal the particular experiences of this community, which I de-
scribe as an overﬂow of meanings, not merely a result of the governmental elite’s will to suppress alternative ver-
sions of the past.The public disclosure of state-sponsored repression played a
key role in the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1986 the head
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mikhail Gorba-
chev, initiated a glasnost (openness) campaign, thus allowing
greater freedom in public debate. Originally meant to com-
bat the economic inefﬁciency of the Soviet system by encour-
aging constructive citizen criticism, glasnost spilled over into
political debate around the repressive origins and character
of the Soviet regime. Arguably one of the most signiﬁcant
and unforeseen developments was the shattering of the myth
of the Soviet Union as a voluntary federation of sovereign re-
publics. On August 23, 1987, groups of Estonian, Latvian, and
Lithuanian dissidents staged public demonstrations to com-
memorate the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 23, 1939),
which was signed just before Germany invaded Poland and
ceded the three countries to the Soviet sphere of inﬂuence.1
This commemoration opened the door to unprecedented pub-
licity about Soviet repression in the Baltic states: the depor-
tation of members of the local population to the gulag, post-
war anti-Soviet resistance, and KGB terror (Kasekamp 2010:
160–171). Although this political shift toward transparency
was not the only factor behind the collapse of the Soviet Union
(the declining economy played an important role), the reve-
lation of Soviet repressions was central for the mobilizationRindzevičiūtė is a Lecturer in Sociology at Kingston University
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In this political context, a complex dynamic of the reve-
lation of past experiences of violence emerged. In Lithuania,
the repression, deportations, torture, and killings performed
by the state’s repressive organizations, including the State
Security Committee (Komitet gosudarstvennoĭ bezopasnosti
[KGB]), affected about a third of the population. This was
known to many, yet until the decline of the Soviet regime,
neither victims nor perpetrators were publicly discussed, al-
beit for different reasons. Knowledge of Soviet repression was
kept secret by both the state authorities, to protect the legit-
imacy of the regime, and survivors, out of fear. The disclosure
of Soviet repression, therefore, involved confronting a highly
complex asymmetry of power but also a difﬁcult problem of
stabilizing the transient, ephemeral character of individual,
personal experiences that would be lost with the passing of
that generation.
In this context, those who survived Soviet repression re-
sorted to the institution of the museum to make a particularly
strong, symbolic statement of commitment not only to reveal
but also to solidify their revelations in a complex material
assemblage, assuring its perpetuation in the future. From the
late 1980s, about 40 museums and exhibitions dedicated to
Soviet repression were organized by grassroots community
organizations across Lithuania (LPKTS 2014). As noted by1. Knowledge about the pact circulated in small dissident circles in
Lithuania from the 1970s. For more, see Šepetys (2006). On Soviet de-
portations, see Khlevniuk (2004); on deportations from Lithuania, see
Grunskis (1996).
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conﬂict-ridden past do not necessarily bring about more so-
cial cohesion; often, instead, such museums contribute to the
fragmentation of society and perpetuation of conﬂict. This
turned out to be the case in post-Soviet Lithuania.
In this article, I examine the formation of the Museum of
Genocide Victims in Vilnius, Lithuania, as an attempt to re-
veal Soviet repression that led to an excessive focus on an
ethnocentric narrative of the past. Following David Shearer
(2009), I deﬁne Soviet repression as the coercive means—
such as arrests, jailing, torture, and killing—by which state
security organizations such as the KGB and its predecessors
controlled the population.2 In the Soviet Union the ﬁrst wave
of mass repressions began as part of the collectivization of the
countryside in the early 1930s; this was followed by the po-
litical purges at the end of the decade. When the Soviets an-
nexed the Baltic states in June 1940, mass repression of the
local population began; thousands were classiﬁed as enemies
of the state and deported to the north and far east. Soviet re-
pression resumed after the end of the SecondWorld War and
continued until 1953. The lives of those who survived pun-
ishment and returned from deportation were marred by social
alienation. Until the late 1980s, knowledge about Soviet re-
pression was a “public secret” so ill deﬁned that it hovered in
the air as an amorphous cloud of fear.
Giving exact content to this secret ruptured Soviet control
of Lithuanian society but also caused huge social tensions,
as many locals collaborated with the repressive apparatus,
either directly or indirectly, while some ﬁghters against the
Soviet occupation in 1944–1953 turned against countryside
people. Further, some survivors of postwar atrocities mis-
treated returning deportees and political prisoners who, in
turn, revealed stories about mutual injustice and violence in
the gulag. In this context, in line with Autry’s (2013) study
on black museums in the United States, I suggest that the
shaping of Lithuanian cultural organizations dedicated to the
commemoration of Soviet repression is best approached as a
highly complex, plural process of revealing that cannot be re-
duced to a governmental strategy to establish one hegemonic
truth. What I propose, therefore, is a substantial revision of
the prevailing interpretation of post-Soviet history museums
in Lithuania, where an excessive focus on the victimization
and heroizing of titular ethnic groups clashes with a require-
ment to balance the narratives of the suffering of the Lithu-
anian population with stories about Lithuanian perpetrators,
who collaborated with either the Soviets and/or the Nazis.
This is a requirement placed on these museums by represen-
tatives of minority groups and the international community.
The Museum of Genocide Victims was established in a
building that served as the headquarters of both the Gestapo
and Sonderkommando, which conducted the extermination2. I use the notions of “Soviet repression” and “Soviet terror” inter-
changeably to refer to the atrocities inﬂicted by the Soviet regime both
through local and occupying actors.
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sariat for Internal Affairs (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutren-
nikh Del [NKVD]), renamed the Committee for State Security
(KGB), from autumn 1940 to June 1941 and from1944 to 1991.
The Holocaust was only acknowledged in passing in the ﬁrst
version of the museum’s exhibitions, which was dedicated
mainly to Soviet repression: from the early 2000s until 2010,
the extermination of Lithuania’s Jews was only mentioned on
an informational plaque in one of the museum’s corridors.
This omission and the use of the word “genocide” in the title,
led commentators such as Mark (2010) to argue that this
museum was an example of the propaganda of post-Soviet
ethnonationalist elites trying to obfuscate the participation of
the local population in the Holocaust. In order to construct
ethnic Lithuanians as a suffering and victimized nation, Mark
argued, the Museum of Genocide Victims actively concealed,
even made secret, the participation of the local population in
the killings of Jews, in the deeds of the communist govern-
ment, and in the civil war. Their involvement instead was sim-
ply framed as anti-Soviet resistance.
Whereas critics correctly register the tension between se-
crecy and disclosure in the museums of Soviet repression, by
constructing their argument around calculated censorship
and ideological struggle they disregard the complexity of the
social mechanisms at work. Deconstruction analysis offers
many perspectives for studying concealment, distortion, and
propaganda. But we lack the conceptual tools to understand
the social and semiotic mechanisms of revealing as a distinct
social practice. One such useful tool, I suggest, can be the met-
aphor of overﬂow, which so far has been used to explore con-
sumption and management but also social interaction (Callon
1998; Lakoff 1987) and which was applied by Czarniawska
and Löfgren (2014:6) to study the process of meaning mak-
ing in organization. In line with Czarniawska and Löfgren, I
deﬁne overﬂow as excess, generated when a substance leaves
one area and enters another, in consequence transforming the
new context. This transformative capacity of overﬂow, write
Czarniawska and Löfgren, tends to be evaluated in moral
terms, as good or bad. It is in this sense that I use the metaphor
of overﬂow to understand the consequences of the post-Soviet
shift from an “acute scarcity” of information about the Soviet
repression to an excess. The desire to reveal the particular ex-
periences of Soviet repression crowded the discursive space,
with better organized grassroots groups being most effective
at disclosing their own secrets. In this case, the overﬂow, pro-
duced by the revelation of Soviet secrets, can be understood
as a historically contingent phenomenon, which is not nec-
essarily an expression of censorship, or in other words, a struc-
tural dismissal of particular stories.
This is clearly revealed in the case of the Museum of Geno-
cide Victims, where the revealing led to an excess of a par-
ticular type of meaning reﬂected at several levels of the or-
ganization: the rationale of the museum, the thematic choice,
and the objects on display. In making this case, I draw on a
historical and ethnographic study conducted from 2010 to.026.023 on January 24, 2016 05:03:06 AM
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4. In contrast to the gulag, some writings on the Holocaust were
allowed, albeit in a highly censored form. Although these admitted the
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on the composition and contents of the exhibition displays
and interviewing members of staff.3 In what follows, I ﬁrst
situate my analysis of the Museum of Genocide Victims in the
context of wider studies of Soviet and post-Soviet secrecy. I
then outline two circuits through which secrets were revealed
in this museum, describe the origins and the exhibits, and
detail the ways in which the revelation of the Soviet repression
became an overﬂow.
Soviet Repression as a Public Secret
In order to understand the importance of the institution of
the post-Soviet museum in revealing these secrets, we need
to begin with an overview of secrecy under the Soviet regime.
The practices of secrecy were central for the existence of So-
viet authoritarianism, but, somewhat surprisingly, they have
rarely been studied as a sociocultural phenomenon. Relevant,
albeit scarce, work engages with national security and the
control of information in the Soviet Union (Ganley 1996;
Hutchings 1987), but the role that secrecy played in control-
ling the Soviet population continues to puzzle social re-
searchers. According to Oleg Kharkhordin (1999), state con-
trol and mutual surveillance pervaded the fabric of the entire
Soviet society, which leads him to suggest that secrecy was
the prerogative of the state and not individuals. In contrast,
Yurchak (2005) and Siegelbaum (2006) argue that social
surveillance was not a mere instrument of state control but
an instrument of self-regulation whereby Soviet citizens had
some room to resist by using irony, complacency, and even
indifference toward the ofﬁcial state organizations.
Soviet citizens could, and did, ignore, mock, or even chal-
lenge many of the ideological postulates of the Communist
Party, but there were very clear limits as to how far one could
go. Even after the death of Stalin in 1953, Soviet repression—
deportations, the gulag, and the KGB terror—remained a
strictly guarded territory about which most people did not
joke. This discursive void was formally assured: the state made
sure that there was nothing to talk about in concrete terms by
concealing the scale of the repressions. The documents per-
taining to the NKVD/KGB terror were classiﬁed as sover-
shenno sekretno (in Russian, completely secret) and were thus
ofﬁcial state secrets. Although during the Thaw (1954–1964),
the mass repressions were acknowledged (and attributed to
Stalin) by the Communist Party, concrete data on their scale
and character were not released into the public domain in the
Soviet Union.
Stalin’s terror was ﬁrst condemned in the famous “secret
speech” by Nikita Khrushchev, delivered to the Central Com-
mittee in Moscow in June 1956. In this address, the script of
which was promptly and intentionally leaked to the West,3. The data involve ﬁeldwork observation of museum exhibitions and
interviews and correspondence with the museum staff as well as with rel-
evant heritage specialists and academic historians in Lithuania. Fieldwork
was carried out in 2011, 2012, and 2013.
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dividuals, wrongly stigmatized as “enemies of the people,” and
he defended Lenin, who, he argued, used violence only when
necessary. Khrushchev’s leaked speech was published by the
Observer and theNewYorkTimes in June 1956 (Reitt 2006), but
it took a while before the repression surfaced in the Soviet
media, and then only brieﬂy. The prominent Russian writer
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn recalled that in spite of Khrushchev’s
denouncement of Stalin’s repression, he did not dare to show
his writings on the gulag even to his close acquaintances.
Solzhenitsyn’s intuition was correct: his story about an inmate
of the gulag, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, published
in 1962, was attacked by the Moscow Party Secretary in 1965
and withdrawn from public libraries (Allén 1993). This act of
censorship signaled that Stalinist repression was not a legiti-
mate subject for public discussion. The legacy of this policy
shift was enduring: for example, recent research indicates that
the restriction of the information about gulag appeared to have
strongly contributed to the absence of this theme from the
public knowledge in Russia (Schuman and Corning 2000:929–
930).4 At the same time, in Soviet Lithuania, local party leaders
were just as willing as Moscow to repress this knowledge. The
ﬁrst secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Antanas
Sniečkus, passed particularly harsh laws that obstructed the
return of rehabilitated Lithuanian deportees and political pri-
soners from the north and far east to Lithuania; this was, ac-
cording to historians, a tactical maneuver, because some of
the returned deportees successfully sued their denunciators
(LGGRTC 2007).
The collapse of the Soviet regime brought about an un-
precedented wave of transparency toward the Soviet past
(Werth 1989), but the actual disclosure of Soviet repression
continued to be limited. In Russia, many survivors of Soviet
repression lived in fear of being repressed again as late as the
1990s. This fear was perceived by some Western researchers
as rather irrational: for instance, an oral historian described a
case when an interviewee, a Russian woman who lived through
the Stalinist repressions, became upset with an oral history re-
searcher who was interviewing her, fearing that she had dis-
closed too much about herself (see Figes 2008:122–123). But
such interviewees were right to be concerned: many oral his-
torians did not bother to anonymize their interlocutors, ig-
noring the sociopolitical conditions in Russia that made re-
vealing risky. In Lithuania, the context for revealing Soviet
repression was radically different, as this type of revelation was
legitimized by the overall popular support for the secession
from the Soviet Union and the overhaul of the repressive state
structure. I detail this in the next section, where I analyze theparticipation of the local population in the killings, they did not specify
it, and they placed all blame on the Nazis (Bendikaitė 2010:137; Gaunt
2010). As a result, Jewish suffering was hopelessly lost in the narratives
of the great patriotic war (Weiner 2001).
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of Soviet repression led to an overﬂow of meanings requiring
new modes of coping.
An Overﬂow of Revealing: The Community
Origins of the Museum
The idea of memorializing the headquarters of the Soviet
Lithuanian KGB was suggested by the Union of Political
Prisoners and Deportees (UPPD) and adopted in a decree of
the Lithuanian Supreme Council in August 1991,5 even be-
fore the Lithuanian branch of the KGB was ofﬁcially dis-
banded.6 Established as a club in 1988, UPPD united the sur-
viving, previously repressed citizens of Lithuania and, in its
ﬁrst publication, declared that it would take up the respon-
sibility to become “a bridge between our own dead ones and
the ones who would live after us” (Butkevičius 1988:2). Out-
lining different means of bringing back previously suppressed
experiences of life under the Soviet system, this program in-
volved the making of a museum of the Stalinist repression.
When, 3 years later, the KGB left its headquarters, the UPPD
quickly mobilized to lobby for the establishment of a museum
on the premises. Thus, the initiative to create and also select
the highly controversial title for the Museum of Genocide
Victims did not come from academic circles or the govern-
ment but from the UPPD, a grassroots organization. Further-
more, the idea of establishing a museum of Soviet repression
built on a rather striking practice of private and secret collec-
tion: it appeared that Lithuanian survivors of the Soviet re-
pression kept thousands of images and everyday objects hidden
away in family archives with the hope of using them in the
future. To compare, far fewer previously repressed Russian
citizens preserved objects as mementos of their terrible expe-
riences as gifts for the future, thus making the establishment
of the Russian museums of Soviet repression a more chal-
lenging task.7
The physical location of the KGB headquarters was far
from secret: a grand building, built in a historicist style in 1899
and used for different administrative purposes, it was situ-
ated on the main Gediminas Avenue, leading from the Ca-
thedral Square to the then Supreme Council, now the Parlia-
ment House and the National Library, in the heart of the city
of Vilnius, with extensive pedestrian and road trafﬁc going past
it. The UPPD wished to turn the whole building into a me-
morial, a material reminder of the death and torture concealed5. LR nutarimas [The decree of the Parliament of the Republic of
Lithuania], “Dėl VSK/KGB aukų atminimo įamžinimo” (Vilnius, Au-
gust 1, 1991).
6. For more, see Anušauskas (2012), Burinskaitė (2011), Rindzevi-
čiūtė (2013). In the 1990s many ex-KGB ofﬁcers formed private security
ﬁrms; see Juska (2009).
7. I base this statement on personal communication with Irina Flige,
the director of the St. Petersburg Memorial Research and Information
Centre, Paris, May 23, 2014.
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new Lithuanian government ofﬁcially condemned the Soviet
crimes against humanity, it also needed space to house new
state institutions, and pragmatismwon against idealism: a large
part of the building was given to the courts. The remainder
housed the newly established Special Archives of KGB rec-
ords. One wing was allocated to the museum.
Deeply concerned that the memory of the KGB’s crimes
would be lost in the turmoil of post-Soviet transformation,
the UPPD produced a particular discourse that would soon
be criticized as an overﬂow. Committed to the idea that So-
viet crimes were a case of “genocide,” the UPPD’s plan for
the museum disregarded the fact that the building also housed
the Gestapo headquarters in 1941–1944. The verbatim tran-
scription of parliamentary debates and also my interview with
a historian involved in the establishment of the museum show
that this striking omission appeared in the very particular
context of turbulent political and economic change: the Lith-
uanian economy was collapsing, and it was feared that the
newly elected president, an ex–Communist Party leader, would
clamp down on the revelation of Soviet repression. Govern-
ment interest in tracing individuals who cooperated with the
Soviet repressive apparatus was not immediate; it was only in
November 1999 that a lustration commission was founded to
identify and make public the individuals who cooperated with
the KGB and other authorities of the Soviet regime and to
formulate a policy limiting the employment of these individ-
uals in strategically important state institutions, including banks,
schools, and the government. In spite of a slow start of the lus-
tration process, in the end Lithuania adopted a rather strict
policy in comparison to other East European countries (Ravaitytė
2015:49–50, 76).
In addition to this complicated political context, the cul-
tural administrative context was averse to new initiatives that
required high expenditure, such as museums. Likemany other
new cultural organizations of the 1990s, the museum was
hastily organized with a limited budget and without any sys-
tematic support from heritage or history professionals. In an
interview, an ofﬁcial who specialized in the heritage sector at
the then Ministry of Culture and Education recalled visiting
the newly established Museum of Genocide Victims to ﬁnd
a confused staff, abandoned hallways, and the UPPD’s mem-
bers sitting in the former prisoners cells as a sign of protest
because they were concerned about plans to repaint and san-
itize the basement. In the 1990s, the museum was so severely
underfunded that it “barely functioned,” according to a mem-
ber of UPPD (LR Parliament 1997). This situation changed
only from the late 1990s, when the museum was transferred
from the Ministry of Culture to the Center for Research on the
Genocide of Lithuania’s Inhabitants and Resistance.8 The ﬁrst8. The museum’s mission is “to collect, conserve, study, exhibit, and
promote historical materials and documents that reﬂect the repressions
of the occupational government against Lithuania’s inhabitants” (char-
ter of the Museum of Genocide Victims, July 30, 1997).
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museum has boasted a consistently growing number of visi-
tors (63,791 visitors in 2014), has been performing well eco-
nomically, and is receiving considerable governmental fund-
ing (data from the Lithuanian Ministry of Culture, 2013).
However, the excessive focus on the Soviet repression
stirred an international controversy. The use of “genocide”
to describe Soviet terror in the title of the museum was crit-
icized, and the museum attracted further criticism for dedi-
cating only a very small part of its exhibitions to the Holo-
caust (Steele 2008). Rohdeval (2008:179), for instance, wrote
that the museum solely focused on the hegemonic, ethno-
centric narrative framing the Soviet crimes as a disruption of
Lithuania’s sovereignty, conﬂicting with the involvement also
of local, ethnic majorities as perpetrators. In all, scholars and
commentators saw the museum as evidence that the Lithua-
nian elites refused to engage with a complex past in which Lith-
uanians were both victims and perpetrators.9
However, as I indicated earlier, it was not “the elites” who
organized this museum but the members of the UPPD, pre-
viously repressed, socially and economically disenfranchised
individuals, many of whom were elderly at the time of the
controversy and who sought to make their experiences known
to the public. To be sure, the UPPD saw its mission as a
struggle for the “historical truth,” yet its members were build-
ing on their personal experiences of Soviet repression. As
the UPPD’s efforts eventually crystallized in an increasingly
well-attendedmuseum, their community-building efforts over-
ﬂowed into the wider agenda of the public cultural sector, thus
becoming an uncomfortable excess.
Subsequent development of themuseum can be understood
as an attempt to manage this overﬂow of the community’s
narrative into a public museum. At the beginning of the con-
troversy, themuseum’s staff representatives reacted defensively
to criticisms of the insufﬁcient coverage of the Holocaust in
their exhibitions by pointing to the existence of Vilna Gaon
Jewish Museum, which had several exhibitions on the Holo-
caust, and arguing that in Lithuania, state cultural organiza-
tions avoided duplicating each other (although if one applied
the same logic to art museums, this argument appears weak).
Later, staff agreed that the focus of the museum exhibitions be
widened. Substantial changes began in 2010 when a docu-
mentary video on the Holocaust was included in the exhibi-
tion, with explicit acknowledgment that Lithuanians were in-
volved in killing Jews. In 2013 a prison cell in which Jewish
prisoners had been held was refurbished to acknowledge this
horriﬁc aspect of the building’s past. In October 2012 and
again in 2013, a group of members of Parliament suggested
that the title of the museum be changed from the Museum of9. See Steele (2008). In the museum, the killings of Jews in Lithuania
were initially only referred to in the texts that accompanied the ex-
hibitions, although the research center, to which the museum belonged,
had done a lot of research on the Holocaust. For a good overview of
Lithuanian scholarship on Jewish history and the Holocaust, see Liekis
(2011).
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(LR Parliament 2013). Although the UPPD protested against
the renaming, these changes clearly show that museum staff
sought to adjust the excessive revealing of the UPPD’s version
of the past, thus questioning the idea of a consensual, elite-
driven ethnocentrism (BNS 2013).
To summarize, the holding, sharing, and revealing of se-
crets was central to the origins of the museum as it was es-
tablished and initially maintained by a particular community
of survivors of Soviet repression. Whereas these survivors
held it imperative to disclose the details of their terrible ex-
periences, they paid little attention to a more inclusive his-
torical narrative to account for historical complexities during
which perpetrators exchanged their positions with victims and
for the complex ethnic, political, and social dynamics of So-
viet repression. The establishment of the Museum of Genocide
Victims was driven by the imperative of gifting previously
suppressed experience and knowledge to the future (Davis and
Manderson 2014; Gradén 2013; Mauss 2000 [1954]). Yet the
museum staff found it necessary to face the requirement of
objectivity as posed to them by both professional historians and
representatives of the Jewish community.
Whereas the establishment and general thematic orienta-
tion of the museum can be attributed to the UPPD commu-
nity’s wish to reveal its own secrets, the actual exhibitions,
which were professionally produced, constituted a rather dif-
ferent instance of the revelation of secrets. In the next section,
I draw on the idea of strategic disclosures, selective as to what
to reveal and what to conceal (Davis and Manderson 2014:
160), to probe the ways in which excessive meaning occurs
in the presentation of victims and perpetrators of the Soviet
repression in the exhibitions at the Museum of Genocide
Victims. My purpose is to alert the critics of the museum to
the presence of different kinds of excess at different levels of
organization, which should open up analysis to look beyond
an ethnocentric narrative. Having brieﬂy described the set-
tings and exhibitions of the museum, I detail several salient
examples of such excess.
Overﬂow in Strategic Disclosures
Curatorial framing plays a fundamentally important role in
the Museum of Genocide Victims. The museum is housed in
an imposing, large building, but the visitor enters not through
the impressive porch (which leads to the courts and the Spe-
cial Archives) but through a smaller door in a side wing not
visible from the main street. The front of the building is
marked, however, with the engraved names of people killed by
the KGB in its basement. The framing also continues inside,
where the spatial setting clearly speaks to the visitor that this is
not a purpose-built museum. The entrance hall is crammed,
consisting of a midsize stairway and a tiny box ofﬁce that also
sells relevant publications. The exhibitions about the history
of repression are situated in the former KGB ofﬁces, situated
along corridors on the ground and ﬁrst ﬂoors. The basement.026.023 on January 24, 2016 05:03:06 AM
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and an execution room.10 In this way, the visitor is offered
a mediated experience of the history of repression through
exhibitions and (relatively) direct experience of the KGB’s
prison.
It is a historical museum, and the exhibition narrative is
organized around a chronological frame: it begins with the
Soviet occupation, brieﬂy touches on the Nazi occupation and
the Holocaust, and proceeds to detail postwar resistance ﬁghts
and deportations from the 1940s to 1953 and KGB activities in
Lithuania from the 1950s to the 1980s. In all, the curators
introduce eight principal themes, the titles of which mark the
halls and are brieﬂy presented in the accompanying catalog.
Two sections tell the story of anti-Soviet resistance, three sec-
tions are dedicated to the experiences of Lithuania’s inhabi-
tants in the gulag, and two sections detail the activities of the
KGB and societal resistance during the post-Stalinist period,
from the late 1950s to the 1980s. The most recent addition,
from 2011, details the history of the Holocaust in the Vilnius
region.11 At the moment of writing in 2015, therefore, the his-
torical narratives articulated in the exhibition are consider-
ably better balanced than they were in the ﬁrst version of the
displays, installed in the early 2000s. However, there are fur-
ther unresolved tensions rooted in the overﬂow of meanings
at the level of the exhibits.
It is a widespread educational practice among contempo-
rary history museums to frame their exhibits and guide visi-
tors’ attention with accompanying texts. TheMuseum of Geno-
cideVictims is no exception. The texts, providing background
historical information, are printed on the glass that separates
visitors from the exhibits. The exhibits themselves largely fall
into four categories: objects, original photographs and doc-
uments, copies of photographs and documents, and video
materials. The overall effect of the exposition is to create an
environment appealing to different senses by using sound, al-
ternating dim and bright light, and aesthetically appealing,
modern exposition designs that combine glass, color, and dec-
orative installation while at the same time trying not to overdo
it by letting the exhibits speak for themselves. The building
itself, particularly the prison and punishment cells in the base-
ment, forms an experiential environment. The cells are ghastly:
the walls are dilapidated, although not necessarily authentic:
for instance, the cold water punishment cell is a reconstruc-
tion, the original one having been removed in the 1950s. In10. Because of limited space, I leave out the museum’s branch in
Tuskulėnai, established in 2002.
11. The themes are “Lithuania in 1940–1941,” “Partisan War, 1944–
1953,” “Uneven Fight—Suppression of Armed Resistance,” “Lithuania’s
Inhabitants in the Gulag, 1944–1956,” “Deportation, 1944–1953,” “Life
Continues,” “KGB, 1954–1991,” and “Civil anti-Soviet Resistance, 1954–
1991.” The exposition also includes an eavesdropping ofﬁce, prisoners’
chambers, and an execution room. The most recent addition is an ex-
position titled “Nazi Occupation and the Holocaust in Lithuania,” in-
stalled in one of the prisoner cells in the basement in 2011.
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just above the surface of ice cold water. Another punishment
cell features soft-padded walls; its function is unclear. Never-
theless, these punishment cells require little curatorial framing
to emotionally affect the visitor. More surprisingly, the exe-
cution room, where about 1,000 individuals were killed from
1944 to the mid-1960s, has been refurbished into a memorial,
featuring exhibits and, under a glass ﬂooring, forensic archae-
ological ﬁndings from the KGB’s secret burial grounds.
Thus, the museum exposes to the visitor two environ-
ments: one orderly, mediated by the exhibition design, his-
torical narratives, and labels, and another one, relatively raw
and untamed, perceived by some as excessive: for instance,
an exposition guard told me that it was high time to repaint
the basement so that “it would be neater and nicer.” How-
ever, as I show below, the part of the exposition that is care-
fully framed by professional curators also spills over with
excessive meanings that are not addressed in the curators’
explicit narratives.
The curatorial framing, as mentioned earlier, principally
involves a historical chronology, the division of the exhibi-
tion into thematic blocks. But it also provides perhaps the
most important disclosure of the scale of Soviet repression and
anti-Soviet resistance, something that can only be revealed
by numbers that set individual events and cases into a larger
context. Numbers, as Porter (1996) has noted, are a powerful
rhetorical instrument in political debate. Based on an ab-
stract system of signs, quantiﬁcation posits a highly deperson-
alizing technique of governing the social. Neither lives nor
deaths can be straightforwardly compared with each other;
numbers can. Numbers evoke a feeling that something was
big or small; they may impress the beholder and help to con-
textualize an individual case. Thus, a large number of victims
would efﬁciently illustrate the evil of the Soviet system; the
small number of anti-Soviet resistance ﬁghters might be inter-
preted as the futility of patriotism.
The numerical discourse of Soviet crimes is an important
context-setting tool that augments the previously abstract
awareness that repressions had taken place with a new sense
of scale and signiﬁcance. In cooperation with the Genocide
and Resistance Research Center of Lithuania, the museum
not only displays but also produces numbers; for instance, it
runs a database of Lithuania’s inhabitants who suffered from
the Soviet regime. In 2012 this database contained informa-
tion on about 178,000 victims, approximately 47,530 partici-
pants in anti-Soviet resistance ﬁghts, and about 17,700 per-
petrators of repressions. (This database does not include the
victims and perpetrators of theHolocaust; the latter are counted
in other, interconnected databases).12 Although this database
is not made available online to the public, it is used internally
by museum staff and visiting researchers as a heuristic tool,12. In 2014 it was established that at least 2,055 Lithuanian inhab-
itants directly or indirectly participated in killings during the Holocaust
(LGGRTC 2012).
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growing knowledge of the scale of the repression and the sta-
bility of the exhibition displays, which soon might be out of
date.
If the prison and punishment cells speak through their ma-
teriality, exhibitions speak through objects and photographs
that represent individuals. Many museums of contemporary
history rely on the medium of photography to communicate
the past; so does the Museum of Genocide Victims. The ﬁrst
thing that a visitor entering the museum encounters is hun-
dreds of photographs, printed on the glass walls surround-
ing the entrance. If the numerical discourse was produced by
professionals, the material part of the exhibitions came from
individual voluntary donations to the museum. These donors
provided the museum with the means to develop detailed
knowledge about the Soviet repression but had little inﬂu-
ence on the ways in which the museum curators chose to
frame these objects in the exhibitions. This is, naturally, a
legally regulated situation: the act of donation includes a clause
that allows the museum to use the donated material in any
way it chooses in its expositions as well as any other public
presentations.13 The museum’s charter does not cover issues of
personal data; according to an interviewed museum employee,
instead of drawing on formal guidelines, staff are guided by a
tacit understanding of what is an appropriate exposure.14
However, giving an object to the museum means opening
oneself up to the possibility of being exposed in public with
little control over such exposure. Former deportees, for exam-
ple, donated photographs depicting persons in conditions of
distress. All photographs on display are labeled; when known,
these labels reveal names, dates, locations, and biographical
details. As these labels do not tell any stories, the photographs,
I would suggest, are exhibited to turn the visitor into a witness
of the Soviet repression rather than a reader, a critic of a his-
torical narrative. As a result, it is not always clear what is being
witnessed. The images overﬂow with potential meanings.
One such distinct example of an overﬂow of meanings in
images, intended by curators to reveal the extent of suffering
and ability to endure, is the visual references to issues of class
and gender. Here the images of women and anti-Soviet ﬁght-
ers are particularly telling. One photograph, included in the
catalog, shows Lithuanian women, in worryingly light clothes,
laying rails across a snow-covered forest (Laying a narrow
gauge railway, Irkutsk, 1956). Although malnourished, these
women do not look unhappy or ashamed of their situation:
they pose, some of them holding axes, as elegantly as they can13. The museum law regulates only the distribution of the data about
collections, which are held elsewhere. However, in addition to this
legislation, the Museum of the Victims of Genocide regulates its ac-
tivities on the basis of the Law on the Protection of Personal Data.
According to the modiﬁcation of 2011, this law does not apply to data
about deceased persons.
14. Written communication from an employee of the Museum of
Genocide Victims, January 14, 2014.
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ing women deportees and its presence in the museum’s col-
lection is, in fact, telling much more than just detailing the
hard conditions of labor. According to Dalia Leinarte (2012),
the Lithuanian female deportees spoke about the hard labor
that they had to do during deportationsmore candidly than the
deported Polish women. Leinarte attributed this difference to
the different value of manual labor in these cultures: Polish
women found the admission of being able to survive hard work
as damaging their class status; they were ashamed of having
done and survived hard work and effectively refused to share
this experience in public. In contrast, Lithuanian women de-
portees, as they revealed in their memoirs, did not hide their
ability to work hard; this is manifest in this picture.
Similarly overﬂowing with references to social class are the
photographs taken by postwar anti-Soviet resistance ﬁghters.
Many pictures show men immersed in their everyday tasks,
such as shaving, bathing in a lake, or cooking. Whereas some
images are amateurish snapshots, very many are carefully
and professionally produced: the ﬁlm was correctly exposed
to the light, the prints are of high quality, the ﬁgures ele-
gantly composed. In turn, the depicted Lithuanian partisans
appear to know how to pose and sport their uniforms ele-
gantly. For instance, the image labeled The partisans of Ša-
rūnas division on the bank of the river Šventoji, 1947–1948
shows a group of six men and one woman looking pensively
over a scenic river, an idyllic scene, set 3 years into armed re-
sistance. Other images show the partisans’ liaisons, often at-
tractive young women. The women seen in the image The chief
of the East Lithuanian sector with liaisons (no later than 1949)
look cheerful and charming; their hair is nicely done. Some,
it seems, even ﬂirt with the camera. But, as noted by Čepulyte
(2011:122), the contrast between self-representation and the
real conditions of the partisans was stark. Partisans dwelled
in poverty; they were dependent on food provisions donated
by, or, in some cases, extorted from the local population.
They mainly lived in secret bunkers, claustrophobically tiny
spaces dug in the forest, expecting support from the West
that never arrived (Statiev 2010). It is very likely that these
photographs were created in order to add an aesthetic di-
mension, perhaps as a memento of prewar life, and they
were framed by the curators exactly as such (this part of the
exhibition being titled “Life Continues”). But these images
also overﬂow with class connotations, suggesting that the
upper strata of the society was involved in the ﬁght against
the Soviet occupation, something that so far has not been
addressed systematically either by the museum staff or ac-
ademic researchers.
My third example of the curators’ strategic disclosure lead-
ing to an overﬂow concerns the issue of privacy in the pro-
cess of revealing Soviet repression. The sections on the Soviet
and Nazi occupations and Sovietization of the 1940s to early
1950s contain many pictures taken by members of the re-
pressive organizations, the NKVD/KGB, which present shock-
ingly graphic images of the mutilated bodies of the anti-Soviet.026.023 on January 24, 2016 05:03:06 AM
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as the market squares of small towns. One image showed the
wife of a doctor, Antanas Gudonis, mourning the body of her
husband, who was tortured to death by the Red Army (dated
June 26, 1941). This is a private, emotionally charged picture,
taken, most likely, as a memento by a friend of the devastated
wife. Another group of pictures shows executed anti-Soviet
partisans, photographed, most likely, by members of the So-
viet security organizations. These pictures illustrate the act
of display, intended to perform governmental power through
public demonstrations of brutality. In the Stalinist era, ac-
cording to Verdery (2014), the presence of the NKVD/KGB
was made public through such violent displays. In Soviet
Lithuania, the display of death in public space was an extraor-
dinary communication device through which the Soviet gov-
ernment sought to terrorize the local population into sub-
mission. This changed after the death of Stalin: by the time that
the student Romas Kalanta immolated himself in public in
front of the central administration of Kaunas as a means of
protest against the Soviet regime in 1972 (see Swain 2013), the
Soviet government had shifted from proclaiming its power
through public displays of violence to actively suppressing
knowledge about the victims of the anti-Soviet resistance it had
formerly made so public. From the 1960s, the KGB increas-
ingly operated not through displays of violence but through
instilling a fear of its omnipresent surveillance; its key fea-
tures were no longer the severity of violence but its possi-
bility, omnipresence, and predictability (Beissinger 2002:333;
Kharkhordin 1999). In this context, any revelations were
scarce and were conﬁned to very carefully controlled spaces,
for instance, the hidden commemoration of the victims of
the NKVD in the 1940s–1950s, when secret monuments were
erected in the Lithuanian countryside (Čepulytė 2011:117), or
the memoirs of deportees, copies of which were circulated
underground, within a small dissident circle (Davoliūtė 2013).
My fourth example of overﬂow refers to the asymmetry
between the material presence assumed by victims and per-
petrators in the museum. If the images of the anti-Soviet ﬁght-
ers and deportees seek to bring back their private experiences
of fragile lives into the public domain, the Soviet regime’s
formal secrets are revealed in the halls dedicated to the his-
tory and activities of the KGB. Small in size, so that only a
few visitors can enter them at once, these halls are ﬁlled with
hundreds of passport-size photographs, normally black and
white, ﬁxed on organizational charts. The structure of the
KGB, both the all-union and Soviet Lithuanian sections, is
revealed as a tree of faces, names, and birth dates. Several
photographs document formal occasions, such as the ofﬁce
parties of KGB employees. There are, noticeably, hardly any
images of the private lives of KGB ofﬁcers; the photographs
depict only ofﬁcial scenes at the KGB ofﬁces, although some
pictures of NKVD ofﬁcers at leisure in the 1940s–1950s are
presented.
This absence of images of the private lives of perpetrators
could be an instance of the lack of an appropriate form ofThis content downloaded from 141.241
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms acultural mediation, enabling the disclosure of either the So-
viet perpetrator or what Hannah Arendt called a banal, ev-
eryday evil. In Soviet history, Lynne Viola (2013) notes, the
ﬁgure of the perpetrator, albeit borrowed from the literature
on the Holocaust, has remained incompletely conceptual-
ized. There is no established way of presenting an ordinary
KGB ofﬁcer, for example, a desk clerk who spent her or his
days eavesdropping on telephone conversations. It is partic-
ularly difﬁcult, Viola (2013:10) argues, to populate the bot-
tom of the pyramid of Soviet perpetrators, for where does
one stop? Should one include the individuals who provided
social support to the KGB ofﬁcers? Should the members of the
Communist Party be included? There is no easy answer to these
questions. However, as a result, the museum discloses the pri-
vate lives of victims but not of perpetrators, thus leaving the
prerogative of perpetrators to stay invisible, unchallenged.
Conclusion
I have demonstrated how the disclosure of previously secret
Soviet repression has led to an overﬂow of meanings in the
Museum of Genocide Victims. First, the establishment of the
museum was in itself a statement of disclosure of the Soviet
repression as a public secret, its original idea being to com-
memorate the experience of a particular group of the survi-
vors of Soviet repression. However, when the “public secret”
had to be ﬂeshed out with concrete information in order to
be revealed to society, the museum initially failed to manage
the overﬂow of the survivors’ own version of the past into
the public presentation of Lithuania’s history. As a result, the
story about the Holocaust, particularly as it was associated
with the museum’s building, was sidelined.
The metaphor of overﬂow is a good analytical tool enabling
us to understand not only the origins of the museum but also
the complexity of its expositions. Whereas scholars have so
far analyzed the museum through the critical prism of bal-
ancing the accounts about the Soviet repression with the par-
ticipation of the local population in the Holocaust, an on-
going and still not fully resolved issue, the central tension in the
museum in fact concerns the multiple effects of revealing
where the revealing itself is driven by the tension between the
Soviet state and the individual. This state-individual tension is
central to understand the asymmetric power to suppress and
disclose information in the context of Soviet repression. It is
not coincidental that in Soviet studies, privacy is generally
deﬁned as an individual’s ability to disclose and not to retain
personal information. According to Reid (2006), for an indi-
vidual, “privacy is constituted not by concealment or solitude
per se, but by discretion over disclosure of information about
oneself, the right to make decisions, to promulgate rules of
action, to dispose over resources and space” (148). Accord-
ingly, to reveal her personal experiences of Soviet repression
in public was the ultimate way for a Soviet person to assert her
right as a private individual. Here the revelation of past secrets
emerges as a highly transformative and complex process of.026.023 on January 24, 2016 05:03:06 AM
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also with the ethics and aesthetics of revelation.
Some victims of the Soviet regime wished to make their
private lives public. They sought to show the ways in which
the Soviet state brutally intervened in their private lives, strip-
ping them of both their privacy and, if they survived, any role
in public life for them or their children. For them, to enter
a museum was to enter a special, elevated public sphere, to
become a signiﬁcant element in the grand narrative of politi-
cal history. In contrast, the perpetrators, the agents of power
in Soviet society, tried to keep their public lives private and
their pasts secret. This post-Soviet practice of revelation can-
not be properly understood when considered separately from
the mechanism of secrecy in Soviet society. The keeping of a
secret under the Soviet regime was a complex and ambigu-
ous activity: people were to keep secrets from one another,
particularly about the activities of the state, but they were
not to keep secrets from the state, and the control of secrets
about individuals by the state was a key component of its
power. The existence of state repression was known to many,
either directly or indirectly, but this knowledge was rarely
shared, even in private. The sharing of these secrets, then, was
an act of power, a demonstration from those enacting it that
they were no longer under the control of the Soviet regime.
The notion of overﬂow refocuses critical analysis, enabling a
shift to a different politics of balancing the different narratives
of a difﬁcult past. The logic of revealing, rather than conceal-
ing, may lead to different conditions for dialogue and sensitize
researchers to the complex motivations for the disclosure of
Soviet repression.
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